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In May of 2016, the Denver Law Review published a series of invit-
ed articles on the timely topic of the James Holmes murder trial. The
Law Review solicited articles from the Defense, the Prosecution, and the
Judge who participated in the Holmes case.' The defense lawyers and the
judge both wrote articles relating to the Holmes litigation.2 By contrast,
the prosecutors, George Brauchler and Rich Orman, used the opportunity
to write an attack on prior empirical studies of Colorado's death penalty
that we conducted.3 The Law Review has now offered us an opportunity
to respond to the Brauchler and Orman attack on our work and our credi-
bility.
I. Tyson L. Welch, Foreword, 93 DENv. L. REV. i, i (2016).
2. See Kristen Nelson, Tamara Brady & Daniel King, The "Evil" Defendant and the "Hold-
out" Juror: Unpacking the Myths of the Aurora Theater Shooting Case as We Ponder the Future of
Capital Punishment in Colorado, 93 DENV. L. REV. 595, 595 (2016); Carlos A. Samour, Jr., Effectu-
ating Colorado 's Capital Sentencing Scheme in the Aurora Theater Shooting Trial, 93 DENV. L.
REV. 577, 577 (2016).
3. See George Brauchler & Rich Orman, Lies, Damn Lies, and Anti-Death Penalty Research,
93 DENV. L. REv. 635, 635 (2016).
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At the outset, we want to be clear that as scholars we welcome chal-
lenges to our work that allow us to revise our thinking, improve our
methods, or better understand a legal problem. The scholarly enterprise is
at its best when it is informed by vigorous debate and when ideas are
tested through discourse and intellectual exchange. Indeed, we have al-
ready engaged in one very productive debate with a critic of our re-
search.4 Unfortunately, Brauchler and Orman's article lacks any of the
attributes of constructive scholarly criticism. The article does not cite any
of the scholarly literature in this field (much less provide a basis for re-
jecting it); it does not meaningfully engage with the conclusions of our
research. Instead, it resorts to name calling and ad hominem attack by
repeatedly referring to us as disingenuous, biased, inexperienced, unethi-
cal, and uninformed. We were obviously disappointed to see such overtly
political and ad hominem attacks in a law review article and we will use
this Article to briefly respond to the merits of the Brauchler and Orman
critique.
In Part I, we reiterate what we actually did-setting forth our meth-
odology for studying Colorado's death penalty and responding to Brau-
chler and Orman's mischaracterization of our study design. In Part H, we
discuss why we did what we did-elaborating on the well-established
principles of Colorado and federal constitutional law that informed our
study design. This Part serves as a rebuttal of the claims that our work is
somehow divorced from the legal realities of state and federal law. Final-
ly, in Part III, we reiterate our empirical findings and explain how they
compel the conclusion that Colorado's death penalty is unconstitutional.
The Eighth Amendment requires an objective, statutory standard for
identifying the few who can be put to death from among the many who
kill; neither the purported good faith of prosecutors, the availability of
appellate review, nor opportunities for a jury to grant mercy can substi-
tute for this requirement. Because Colorado's homicide statute does not
provide an objective basis for meaningfully narrowing the class of death-
eligible defendants, our state's death penalty scheme violates the Eighth
Amendment.
I. THE STUDY: PURPOSE & METHODOLOGY
The central premise of the Brauchler and Orman article is that our
study design is deeply "flawed"'5 (using this term more than a dozen
times), rests on "cherry-picked"6 data, and was conducted by "experts"
4. Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Remember Not to Forget Furman: A Response to Profes-
sor Smith, 100 IOWA L. REv. BULL. 117, 117-18 (2015); Robert J. Smith, Forgetting Furman, 100
IOWA L. REV. 1149,1149 (2015).




(us) who are both unqualified7 to do an empirical study of capital pun-
ishment and hopelessly biased against the death penalty.8 In this Part, we
will summarize our methodology and respond to the baseless claims that
our research was flawed or biased.
A. Purpose of the Study-The Research Question and Our Biases
The opening paragraph of our study announces our purpose: to as-
sess "whether Colorado's statutory aggravating factors meaningfully
narrow the class of death-eligible offenders."9 As we will lay out in more
detail below, the Eighth Amendment requires the states to make mean-
ingful distinctions between who lives and who dies through comprehen-
sible legislative definitions. With this standard in mind, we examined the
Colorado first-degree murder statute and the aggravating factors that set
out death eligibility to determine whether-in practice-they effectively
reduced the pool of murderers to a much smaller group eligible for death.
We familiarized ourselves with the governing law and the best prac-
tices used by researchers in this field to study this question. As academ-
ics, we genuinely wanted to know how successful our state was in sort-
ing out the worst of the worst killers. To answer this question, we built a
database of every murder prosecution in the state commenced between
January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2010, and studied the facts of each
case to determine whether each defendant could have been convicted of a
capital crime. What we found was that Colorado's first-degree murder
statute is one of the most capacious in the country-nearly 90% of all
murderers could have been convicted of first-degree murder under the
statute, and over 90% of those first-degree murderers were made statuto-
rily eligible for a death sentence by the presence of an aggravating factor
in their case. Based on these numbers, we determined that less than 1%
of all eligible killers were being sentenced to death in Colorado. We thus
concluded that the Colorado murder statute was failing in its task of iden-
tifying the worst of the worst killers and that as a result the exercise of
capital punishment in this state violates the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution.
In Brauchler and Orman's opinion, however, the entire study is a
facade for the promulgation of anti-death penalty rhetoric.'0 Our study,
7. See id. at 652-54. Brauchler and Orman repeatedly contend that we are simply too "inex-
perienced" to undertake this study. See, e.g., id. at 653-54 (citing our "apparent inexperience in the
area of criminal law" as a reason for discounting the study).
8. E.g., id at 640.
9. Justin Marceau, Sam Kamin & Wanda Foglia, Death Eligibility in Colorado: Many Are
Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1071 (2013).
10. E.g., Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 682 ("To achieve their goal of lowering the bar
of punishment for aggravated murderers, the Authors-at the request of a murderer attempting to
avoid the death penalty for his second murder-have applied their questionable expertise and nearly
complete misunderstanding of Colorado's death penalty laws to a biased and flawed set of data
compiled by the murderer's defense team to support a theory they had from the outset: the Colorado
law is defective and unconstitutional.").
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they assert, suffers from "outcome-oriented methodology"" because the
"[a]uthors are anti-death penalty attorneys."l2 An entire section of their
article claims that the "[p]urpose of the [s]tudy at the [o]utset [w]as to
[d]efeat the [d]eath [p]enalty in Colorado." 3 While our study was com-
missioned by counsel for a capital defendant in Colorado, the research
and findings are based on our own independent judgment and work,
which we welcome anyone to replicate. The full methodology that we
used in our study is now a matter of public record, having been submitted
in litigation in a number of capital cases in Colorado.
As a general matter, Brauchler and Orman's claim that no academic
work, even an empirical study such as ours, can be viewed "in any way,
as disinterested [or] unbiased" is nothing less than a frontal assault on
academic scholarship and empirical research.14 To suggest that academ-
ics who hold any personal views on the issue they study are fundamental-
ly incapable of conducting neutral research is an astonishingly sweeping
and cynical perspective. Like Brauchler and Orman, we have personal
views on the merits of the death penalty. Unlike them, however, we set
out to study empirically the realities of the death penalty in Colorado in
order to test our hypothesis. This is the very essence of scientific inquiry;
if research must be discarded because its authors have personal views on
the subject matter, then scientific inquiry is impossible.
Moreover, the suggestion that we have intentionally skewed our re-
sults to conform to our personal views treads dangerously close to libel. 5
Our approach was not result-oriented, but was instead based on the best
practices for empirical legal research in the capital punishment field.'6 As
we have averred under oath, our personal views on the death penalty did
not impact the study methodology. 17 We take the veracity and integrity
11. Id at 652.
12. Id
13. Id at 654.
14. Id at 640.
15. It is defamation per se in many jurisdictions, including Colorado, to imply that one lacks
integrity. See, e.g., People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935, 939 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) (holding that Colora-
do's anti-libel statute could be applied "constitutionally to private defamers who knowingly publish
or disseminate . . . any statement or object tending . . . to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or
reputation of a private individual" (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted)); Tronfeld v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 636 S.E.2d 447, 449-50 (Va. 2006) (describing common law defamation
claims including claims where a person's integrity is attacked). Brauchler and Orman repeatedly say
that our work was biased and cannot be viewed "as disinterested" because our only goal is to see the
death penalty abolished. E.g., Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 640. They claim that our ideolo-
gy "influenced [our] outcome-based research and analysis." Id.
16. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 40-62 (1990) (detailing the methodology used in two death penalty
studies); Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1091-93 (providing a literature review of death
penalty research).
17. Under Brauchler and Orman's view, anyone with reservations about the death penalty,
which is most scholars who have reflected on the issue, is unqualified to study the death penalty. See
Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 640 ("The Authors of Many Are Called and Disquieting Dis-
cretion are anti-death penalty. There is, of course, nothing wrong with that. However, they should
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of our academic work seriously and would not compromise our reputa-
tions for this or any study. Our study is based on concrete, verifiable data
and widely-accepted methodological approaches.'8
But don't take our word for it. The accuracy and robustness of our
conclusions have been verified by a separate study conducted by the
prosecution itself'9 Although Brauchler and Orman are now quick to
dismiss our conclusions as the product of bias and wanton "subjectivi-
ty,"20 when their own team of experts and researchers reviewed our data,
they found "death eligibility rates almost identical to ours (88.4% com-
pared to our 90.4%).",21 The reason for this similarity is easy to explain-
the application of the Colorado murder statute and aggravating factors in
individual cases is not rocket science. We firmly believe that anyone who
uses our dataset o replicate our research will answer our research ques-
tion-do Colorado's aggravating factors effectively narrow the class of
death-eligible defendants-the same way we did. The fact that a team of
prosecutors came to empirical conclusions essentially indistinguishable
from our own is perhaps the clearest refutation of the argument that our
conclusions were driven by our own views on the death penalty.
If further refutation of the claim of subjective bias was necessary-
and we argue that it is not-such evidence is easy to find. For example,
one could engage in the most conservative measure of death eligibility
imaginable by measuring only those aggravating factors in the Colorado
statute that are objectively verifiable (thus not subject to any discretion-
ary judgment calls by researchers).22 Even under this greatly simplified
view of when the death penalty is available in Colorado, the data shows
that the death eligibility rate is still far too high to pass constitutional
muster. As we have previously explained:
We could separate out the following class of indisputably objective
aggravating factors under the Colorado statute: (1) prior violent felo-
ny; (2) already serving a felony sentence at the time of the killing; (3)
pregnant victim; (4) victim was a child; (5) possession of the murder
weapon was a felony; (6) the defendant killed two or more people in
one or more incidents; (7) felony murder; and (8) killing for pecuni-
ary gain. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1201(5) (2014). Based on the-
se aggravating factors alone, over a ten-year period of study, 368
not be perceived, in any way, as disinterested, unbiased academics examining a problem and reach-
ing a conclusion.").
18. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 16, at 40-62.
19. See Prosecution Murder Stud y, People v. Montour, No. 2002-CR-782 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Douglas Cty. Mar. 29, 2013).
20. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 651.
21. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 4, at 121.
22. Of course this is not the approach adopted by the Colorado death penalty scheme which
permits a death sentence when, among other things, any of seventeen aggravating factors are present.
If Colorado's death penalty were limited to objectively identifiable aggravating factors, it would be a
very different and narrower statute. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5) (2016).
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cases (out of the 596 first-degree murders within the study period)
would have objective, indisputable aggravating factors.23
In other words, if we limit our analysis solely to completely non-
subjective aggravating factors, Colorado still has an aggravating factor
rate of over 60%. This would be such a broad murder statute that it
would fail constitutional muster even if all factors requiring judgment
calls were excluded.24 Just these eight factors would permit nearly two-
thirds of all murderers to be put to death. And, of course, the Colorado
statute includes many more than these eight aggravating factors.
The claims that our results are the product of subjectivity, bias, or
result-oriented research are thus demonstrably false. Our dataset une-
quivocally shows a strikingly high aggravating factor rate (and a corre-
spondingly low death-sentencing rate). Brauchler and Orman may not
like this finding, but to call it biased in the face of concrete numbers is
simply disingenuous.
B. The Dataset
Our study is perhaps the most thorough of its kind. One principle
reason for this conclusion is that we did not sample murder cases within
a jurisdiction, but instead studied every single murder case statewide
during the relevant time period of our study. No other similar study has
examined such a broad swath of cases across an entire state. Without
mentioning this fact, Brauchler and Orman also take aim at our dataset,
claiming that "defense [lawyers] limited the data [we] were [able] to
consider."25 Once again, public filings make clear that this claim is false.
Our dataset was created by the State Judicial Branch State Court Admin-
istrator's Office (SCAO) rather than by the defense team and was subject
to a complete review and revision by prosecutors in the course of litiga-
tion. Brauchler and Orman have, in their possession, an affidavit from
the SCAO attesting under oath that they provided to the defense (who
then provided us) a list of every murder during the relevant time period.26
While it is true that defense counsel provided us with the cases that
we analyzed, it is important to remember that they obtained the case list
23. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 4, at 121 n.25 (citing Appendix to Mr. Montour's Brief in
Reply to the Prosecution's Motion to Vacate and to Its Submission of the Prosecution Montour
Murder Study (PMMS) app. J, People v. Montour, No. 2002-CR-782 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Douglas Cty.
Mar. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Montour Appendix]).
24. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has not itself ever suggested that a death sen-
tencing scheme is unconstitutional based on the death eligibility rate alone. Instead the focus has
been on the death sentencing rate-a low death sentencing rate suggests arbitrariness in the applica-
tion of the ultimate penalty. But high death eligibility rates cause low death sentencing rates, and
even with a death eligibility rate of only 60%, the Colorado death sentencing rate would still be well
below the 15% constitutional floor suggested in Furman. Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The
Calfornia Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1288 (1997).
25. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 655.
26. See Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1098 n.148.
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from the SCAO and filed that list with the court in litigation. Defense
attorneys were operating at our direction (rather than the other way
around) regarding which cases to include in the study and which cases to
exclude from the study. Mr. Brauchler's office had the full opportunity
to, and did, thoroughly check the list for completeness and accuracy;
prosecutors had full access to the SCAO and its research capabilities as
well. All of the attorneys who participated in this process-including
Brauchler's team-have an absolute duty of candor to courts.27 In light
of these factors, it was reasonable for us to rely on the good faith of the
lawyers who collected the data used in our study.
Beyond accusations of bias, Brauchler and Orman suggest that we
should have consulted with District Attorneys in the creation of the data
set and given them an opportunity to note any missing murder cases from
the relevant time period. As they put it, "A fair attempt to review all
homicide cases over a limited period would have included seeking sup-
plementation or amendment of the defense-provided list by seeking input
from [prosecutors]."28 In fact, our published study does exactly this. Our
data was turned over to and reviewed extensively by the prosecution and
its own team of experts. The State identified seven cases that qualified
for the study but had not been initially included because their court files
had been sealed in the district court.29 The prosecution provided infor-
mation from their own files and we included all seven cases (all of which
we found to have the presence of at least one aggravating factor). In
court filings, Brauchler's own office conceded that there were no addi-
tional cases that they were aware of that satisfied the study criteria for
the relevant time period.
In short, Brauchler and Orman protest that our dataset was created
by a (dishonest) defense t am without any opportunity for input from the
prosecution. In reality, the dataset was generated by the SCAO and was
subject to screening and revision by the prosecution in the course of liti-
gation.
27. A number of declarations and supporting documents filed in the Montour case by those
responsible for providing, receiving, and reconciling the list, including the SCAO, the Office of
Alternative Defense Counsel (OADC), and others, were filed with the Court. These materials, espe-
cially given the prosecution's ability to verify all of the information, clearly establish that our study
included all known murder cases for the relevant time period. See Montour Appendix, supra note 23,
app. D, E, H.
28. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 655.
29. The Court Programs Analyst for the State Judicial Department signed a Declaration that
was filed with the Court, attesting to the very small number of murder cases tatewide-less than
five a year-that are subject to such sealing orders. See Montour Appendix, supra note 23, app. D;
see also Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1101-02.
30. Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at I101--02.
31. Id. at I101-02, 1101 n.165.
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C. Case Selection and the Coding ofIndividual Cases for Aggravating
Factors
Our study of the effectiveness of Colorado's aggravating factors in
legislatively narrowing the class of death-eligible offenders required us
to examine the details of each individual murder case included in the
dataset. Specifically, we examined the available information about each
case to assess whether the case was a potential first-degree murder,32 and
if so, whether at least one aggravating factor was applicable to the
crime.3 3
Brauchler and Orman criticize this aspect of our research because,
in their view, our analysis was based on a "lack of reliable information"
about each case.34 In particular, they fault us for not having the police
report or affidavit in support of probable cause in many cases, and for
relying on media reports regarding the crimes in a non-trivial number of
the files.35 While this critique might appear reasonable, upon closer ex-
amination, it too fails to taint our research.
First, we note the information asymmetry under which we were op-
erating. The files that we received from the defense team contained all of
the information they were able to access from the SCAO. In the cases
where we did not have certain court-related documents, including the
probable cause documents, it is because the courts would not release
those documents to us-often because they were sealed. We are entirely
open to updating or amending our findings, and have done so as new
documents, such as appellate decisions in the studied cases, became pub-
licly available. If Brauchler and Orman think that we have misunder-
stood or misinterpreted cases, they should make available to us any in-
formation they possess that they think we are missing. In their article,
however, they point to no actual errors in our analysis and offer no sup-
plemental data to critique our methodology.
Relatedly, Brauchler and Orman identify as the "most concerning"
defect with our dataset the fact that we did not have any "information for
420 of the cases."3 6 They suggest that we "remarkably" coded approxi-
mately 31% of all of the cases in the study without examining a "single
piece of paper" relating to this case.37 This would, of course, be concern-
ing (if not disqualifying) if it were true, but it is not. While it is true that
a number of cases were removed from the study without our analyzing
them, this approach follows the best practices in the field. Those best
32. Our assessment was actually focused on determining whether each particular case was
either "factually" or "procedurally" first-degree murder. Id. at 1103 (defining and applying these
terms of art).
33. Id. at 1102.
34. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 656.
35. Id. at 656-57.




practices call for researchers to remove cases from their dataset when
those cases could never have been capital prosecutions, and that is exact-
ly what we did. We directed the interns and lawyers working for the
Data Collection Team to exclude a number of cases from our dataset for
ministerial reasons. Indeed, a careful reading of our study methodology
explains that we instructed the Data Collection Team "to remove cases
from the study based on three criteria: (1) the absence of a deceased vic-
tim ... (2) the defendant was a juvenile . .. or (3) the defendant was
convicted of [a particularly low level homicide, such as killings done in
the heat of passion, thus suggesting that it was not a factual first-degree
murder.]."39 Brauchler and Orman do not (and could not) contest any of
these rote determinations-they do not, for example, point to a single
defendant who was wrongly excluded from our study on this basis. This
criticism is nothing but a red herring.
Finally, while there is rhetorical force in chiding our study for rely-
ing in part on media accounts of crimes in analyzing our cases (when no
other information was available), some clarification is necessary on this
point as well. First, many of the narratives published in newspapers
about murders include quotes from prosecutors, which we treated as par-
ticularly relevant.40 For example, a quote from a prosecutor that the de-
fendant made good on a previous threat o kill the victim would be rele-
vant in determining that he defendant deliberated his killing. Likewise, a
news account that multiple people were killed or that the victim was an
infant would be highly relevant to assessing whether the crime had an
aggravating factor. Importantly, when we did not believe the file con-
tained sufficient information to determine whether a killing was a first-
degree murder for which an aggravating factor could be proved, we cod-
ed the case accordingly, and it was removed from the dataset.
To be sure, our claim is not that the dataset is perfect. Ours was a
sweeping project involving hundreds of cases from scores of jurisdic-
tions throughout the state; information was kept unevenly in different
counties but it was collected to the best abilities of those charged with
that task. We have done all that we could to confirm the accuracy and
38. Although Brauchler and Orman critique these methodological decisions to exclude cases
that are categorically ineligible for the death penalty, we are in fact making sure that our numbers do
not exaggerate Colorado's low death sentencing rate. Including such cases would skew the results
towards the appearance of unconstitutionality by "faulting" the State for a low death-prosecution
rate. Thus, removing those cases from consideration is a conservative measure that favors the State.
The largest removal category-almost two-thirds of the total-were cases in which there was no
deceased victim, such as attempted murders in which no one was killed. The State cannot constitu-
tionally prosecute a defendant for the death penalty unless someone has been killed, Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008), so we can imagine no principled objection to these exclusions.
39. Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1100-01, 1101 n. 165.
40. See, e.g., John Ingold, James Holmes Trial: Prosecutors Seek Death Penalty in Aurora
Theater Shooting, DENV. POST (Apr. 1, 2013, 3:10 AM),
http://www.denverpost.com/2013/04/01/james-holmes-trial-prosecutors-seek-death-penalty-in-




completeness of our data and continue to work to keep it up to date. Sig-
nificantly, Brauchler and Orman cannot identify a single specific error in
our findings associated with gaps in our data.
D. The Time Period Studied, 1999-2010
Brauchler and Orman also argue that the timeframe of our study
was unrepresentative and "seriously flawed."4' They claim that we ma-
nipulated the period under study in order to bolster a particular conclu-
sion.4 2 This critique is characteristic of their shoot-the-messenger style
and is woefully off-the-mark. Far from cherry-picking our data, we stud-
ied every murder case available to us at the time our study began.
Brauchler and Orman simultaneously complain that we did not
study recent enough cases like that of James Holmes (2015), and that we
did not go far enough back (pre-1999).4 3 As we have previously ex-
plained, the reason for limiting our study to these twelve years were
practical constraints on accessing data rather than decisions made by
anyone involved in the research. Once again, declarations from the Court
Programs Analyst of the Colorado Judicial Branch Division of Planning
and Analysis and the Office of the Alternate Defense Counsel attest to
the fact that the state judiciary provided us a list of every murder in the
state that could be identified through electronically searchable means.44
To put the matter plainly, 1999 was selected as the start of our study pe-
riod because, prior to 1999, there was simply no comprehensive way to
search for all murder cases in a given year. To have gone any further
back in time would have run the risk of producing exactly the kind of
incomplete and unrepresentative data that Brauchler and Orman wrongly
accuse us of using.
In addition, we have no reason to believe (and Brauchler and Orman
have offered no comprehensive data to suggest)45 that Colorado's death
41. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 657-60.
42. See id. at 657-59 (describing the time period used in the study as "seriously flawed and
unrepresentative of the death penalty in Colorado" and claiming that "[t]he Montour defense team
and the Authors chose the best possible dataset to get the results that hey were trying to reach in an
effort to spare Montour from a death sentence, and further, to attempt to declare Colorado's long-
standing death penalty unconstitutional").
43. Id at 659-60.
44. Apparently, the State Judicial Department underwent a computer conversion at the begin-
ning of 1999 that makes impossible reliable, electronic data searches prior to that time. Accordingly,
our study's dataset starts on January 1, 1999, and goes through the end of the last complete calendar
year before we commenced our study in mid-2011; that is, we looked at every murder case that
could be made available to us. Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1098.
45. In a careless half-hearted attempt to characterize our dataset as "cherry-picked," Brauchler
and Orman provide information about six pre-1999 cases they identified. The conclusion seems to be
that if we had only looked back farther in time our conclusions would be fundamentally different.
Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 637, 658-60. Of course, Brauchler and Orman do not and
cannot explicitly make this point because they do not have anything approaching complete data
regarding all the murder cases in the years prior to 1999, as such data is unavailable. The examples
they give, like so much in their article, is a rhetorical sleight of hand. It is absurd to believe that their
analysis of six pre-1999 cases could possibly taint our 12-year, comprehensive study of over 1000
372 [Vol. 94:2
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penalty operated in a fundamentally different way in the years prior to
1999.4 And more importantly, we seriously doubt that such data from
more than seventeen years ago, even if it were available, would shed
considerable light on the current administration of Colorado's death pen-
alty. Our study is an examination of the current functioning of Colora-
do's capital sentencing scheme, not a historical project about how things
worked in the early 1990s.
Likewise, the claim that we deliberately omitted data from more re-
cent years is absurd on its face. Brauchler and Orman repeatedly fault us
for not including cases, like that of James Holmes, but the Holmes crime
had not even occurred when our study was under way and Holmes's trial
was not concluded until years after our study had been published. But
lest there be any lingering doubt about not including more recent cases,
we have continued analyzing cases arising after the end of our original
study, and we will continue to publish those findings as they become
available. Contrary to the claims of Brauchler and Orman, we are genu-
inely interested in what the data will show. Leading experts have con-
cluded that ours is perhaps the best study of death eligibility conducted in
the country to date,47 but as new or better data becomes available, we
strive to update our findings and improve our analysis.
E. Qualifications and Experience
Throughout their article, Brauchler and Orman refer to our research
in scare quotes (they call it a "study" and refer to us as "experts").48 It
seems that their pejorative tone towards our research is based on their
assumption that we are simultaneously too invested in death penalty re-
cases. Indeed, adding all of the cases they mention to our study (even though they are outside the
study period) would make no significant difference in the aggravating factor rate or the death sen-
tence rate, which is what we set out to study.
46. For the sake of completeness, it is worth noting that some aggravating factors were added
in the years just before and after our study window. In 1998, Colorado added a hate-crime aggrava-
tor. H.B. 98-1160, 61st Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., 1998 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 314, § 34 (codified
at COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(n) (1998), repealed by 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 318, § 3). In
2000, the possession of a murder weapon being a felony was added. H.B. 00-1234, 62nd Gen. As-
semb., 2d Reg. Sess., 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 110, § I (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-
103(5)(o) (2000), repealed by 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 318, § 3). And in 2003, aggravators were
added to include pregnant victims and persons who kill two or more persons across more than one
incident. H.B. 03-1138, 64th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess., 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 340, § 5
(codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(q) (2003)); H.B. 03-1297, 64th Gen. Assemb., Ist
Reg. Sess., 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 202, § 1 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(p)
(2003)).
47. See, e.g., Montour Appendix, supra note 23, app. C (consisting of the Declaration of
Steven F. Schatz, the Philip and Muriel Barnett Professor at the University of San Francisco School
of Law and a leading researcher in the field); see also Steven F. Shatz, The Meaning of "Meaningful
Appellate Review" in Capital Cases: Lessons from California, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 82 n. 15
(2016) ("The most recent and thorough discussion of the narrowing requirement appears in Sam
Kamin & Justin Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981 (2015).").
48. E.g., Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 651-52. At one point they criticize us for
crediting our research with being original. Id. at 651 ("[T]he Authors rely on self-declared original
research."). We don't know what they mean by this attack. Our research is undisputedly original.
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search (having spent "the majority of [our] professional careers" on the
issue) and simply too inexperienced (referring to us as "nonpractitioner
academicians").4 9 We have already addressed the claim that our empiri-
cal analysis cannot be trusted because of our supposedly secret agenda to
undermine the death penalty.o In this Part, we will briefly respond to the
claim that we are unqualified to conduct a study such as ours.
First, we note that the argument1 that academics who are not cur-
rently practicing a particular kind of law in a particular jurisdiction are
unfit to analyze and critique that legal system is both deeply cynical and
52remarkably hostile to the academy as a whole. It undermines the entire
enterprise of legal scholarship to suggest that only practicing trial law-
yers are qualified to make empirical assessments of how a legal institu-
tion works in practice. Brauchler and Orman criticize us for not being
disinterested observers, but if anyone is disinterested here, it is those of
us outside the Colorado criminal justice system rather than those who
operate it on a daily basis.
As for our specific qualifications, one of us has a social science doc-
torate, whose background includes training in empirical study design and
implementation. Both of us are among the nation's most well-regarded
legal academics on the topic of the death penalty: we are co-authors of
the new edition of the leading textbook on this topic, we have individual-
ly and jointly been cited with regularity by state and federal courts, in-
cluding a recent dissent in a U.S. Supreme Court decision and the deci-
sion of the Delaware Supreme Court invalidating its state's death penalty
statute.53 We teach a course on capital punishment to law students and
one of us regularly teaches the course to sociology students, and we have
published numerous scholarly articles on the subject. Contrary to Brau-
chler and Orman's claim, our background and experience make us
uniquely qualified to engage in studies of this kind.M It is far more apt to
49. Id. at 651.
50. See supra Section I.A.
51. Under Brauchler and Orman's reasoning the greatest empirical researchers in history,
including David Baldus, would be categorically unfit to study the administration of the death penalty
in any state because they are not lawyers. See generally Adam Liptak, David C. Baldus, 75, Dies;
Studied Race and the Law, N.Y. TiMES (June 14, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/us/15baldus.html. This is patently absurd and anti-intellectual.
Such reasoning ought not to have appeared in the pages of a law review.
52. Brauchler and Orman go so far as to suggest hat only attorneys barred in a particular state
are fit to study or critique that state's statutes. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 653 (emphasiz-
ing that we are not "licensed to practice law in Colorado" as evidence of our inability to analyze the
Colorado system accurately).
53. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2761 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally Rauf
v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (per curiam).
54. It is also simply inaccurate to say that we have never practiced law. One of us was an
assistant federal public defender handling almost exclusively death penalty cases for two years,
including a case that went to the U.S. Supreme Court. One of us has continued to practice law,
including criminal and death penalty law, as an academic, and both of us consult with criminal
lawyers, both on the defense and prosecution side. Sam Kamin, Professor, Vicente Sederberg Pro-
fessor of Marijuana Law & Policy, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll, of Law, Curriculum Vits (2016),
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wonder what qualifies Brauchler and Orman to critique the design of an
empirical study, something neither of them have ever done.
II. COLORADO AND FEDERAL LAW INFORMING OUR STUDY'S
METHODOLOGY
Contrary to claims made by Brauchler and Orman, we crafted our
study in accord with governing Colorado and federal law. In fact, these
laws drove our study.
A. Colorado Death Penalty Law
In addition to claims of bias and inexpertise, the central and defin-
ing substantive critique leveled against our study by Brauchler and Or-
man is that we fundamentally misunderstand Colorado law.55 Specifical-
ly, they assert that we fail to see the full picture by focusing on the pres-
ence or absence of aggravating factors rather than viewing the Colorado
capital statute more holistically.56 For example, Brauchler and Orman call
our failure to consider the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors
of the Colorado sentencing process in our assessment of legislative nar-
rowing the "most obvious demonstration of the impact of [our] inexperi-
ence and bias."57 However, this critique turns on a fundamental mischar-
acterization of Colorado law and is simply incorrect as a matter of Eighth
Amendment law.
To reiterate, our study was designed to assess whether Colorado's
statutory aggravating factors were effective in meaningfully narrowing
the class of death-eligible defendants. To make this determination, we
assessed whether a defendant could have been convicted of first-degree
murder and whether or not one or more aggravating factors was present
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/directory/full-time/sam-kamin.pdf; Justin F. Marceau, Professor,
Animal Legal Def. Fund Professor of Law, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law, Curriculum Vita-
(2016), http://www.law.du.edu/documents/directory/full-time/justin-marceau.pdf.
55. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 682 (stating that we "applied [our] questionable
expertise and nearly complete misunderstanding of Colorado's death penalty laws to a biased and
flawed set of data").
56. Id. at 653 n.108. Brauchler and Orman go out of their way to criticize the most trivial
mistakes and misstatements in our study in order to support their claim that we are unqualified to
study Colorado's death penalty. Many of the "mistakes" are matters of style or semantics that have
no relevance. More importantly, most of the instances where Brauchler and Orman attempt to "cor-
rect" us reveal their own ignorance of Colorado law. They repeatedly misstate and mischaracterize
Colorado law. For example, they seize upon a sentence in our study that says that a "defendant
convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, which is a class two felony, could be guilty
of first-degree murder as an accomplice," and claim definitively that this is a "misstatement of
Colorado law." Id. (quoting Justin Marceau, Sam Kamin & Wanda Foglia, Death Eligibility in
Colorado: Many Are Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1100 n.162 (2013)). In
their view, "conspirators are not a subset of accomplices, nor vice-versa." Id. We don't disagree. We
were simply stating that one who has agreed with another to commit murder will often be guilty of
that murder under the separate theory of accomplice liability and that one who has aided another in
his commission of a murder (and is therefore liable for that killing as an accomplice) will often be
found to have entered a conspiracy with the killer. Nothing we wrote in our article was contrary.
Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at I100 n.162.
57. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 653.
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in a given case. Upon finding that nearly all killings during the study
period could have been prosecuted as first-degree murders and that more
than 90% of first-degree murders in Colorado had one or more aggravat-
ing factors, we concluded that the Colorado capital statute was not serv-
ing as an effective, legislatively imposed limit on the imposition of the
death penalty and that as a result, the statute fails constitutional muster.
Our inquiry follows directly from the Supreme Court's own language.
Brauchler and Orman reject this analysis, arguing that there is no
constitutional requirement of legislative narrowing because such a rule
originated in Furman v. Georgia, a seminal Supreme Court decision
that they maintain does not create any binding precedent.5 9 They identify
our focus on Furman as "symptomatic" of our inexperience because we
are "quoting not from the per curiam decision but to ... concurring opin-
ion[s] from the Furman decision."a They maintain, in other words, that
because Furman was a plurality decision, it created no binding precedent
beyond its holding. It is surprising that two capital litigators would so
fundamentally mischaracterize one of the Supreme Court's most im-
portant death penalty decisions; the Court has repeatedly held that Fur-
man is a critically important precedent.6 1 The words of Justice Scalia-
one of the Court's great death penalty defenders-echo with exacting
precision the reading of Furman we rely on in our study (and that Brau-
chler and Orman discount as deeply "flawed reasoning"): "The critical
opinions [in Furman] .. . focused on the infrequency and seeming ran-
58. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40, 313-14 (1972).
59. See Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 664-66.
60. Id. at 664 (footnote omitted).
61. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) ("This is because '[t]he stand-
ard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The
standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society
change."' (alteration in original) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 382 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)));
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173-74 (2006) (detailing the standard for state death penalty sys-
tems that Furman established); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 974-75 (1994) ("We have held,
under certain sentencing schemes, that a vague propositional factor used in the sentencing decision
creates an unacceptable risk of randomness, the mark of the arbitrary and capricious sentencing
process prohibited by Furman . . . ." (citation omitted)); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 240 (1992)
(describing how the Court has applied Furman); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988)
("Since Furman, our cases have insisted that the channeling and limiting of the sentencer's discre-
tion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently mini-
mizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." (citations omitted)); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 301-03 (1987) (discussing Furman's impact on state death penalty schemes); Sumner
v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 70 (1987) ("In Furman, this Court, in effect, invalidated all such capital-
punishment statutes because of its conclusion that statutes permitting juries absolute discretion in
making the capital-sentencing determination resulted in the death penalty's being arbitrarily and
capriciously imposed, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."); Pulley v. Harris,
465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984) ("In Furman, the Court concluded that capital punishment, as then adminis-
tered under statutes vesting unguided sentencing discretion in juries and trial judges, had become
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment."); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983)
(describing the Court's opinion in Furman as a "central mandate"); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 427-28 (1980) (describing Furman's holding); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977)
(describing Furman's holding); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (stating that Furman
established requirements that are necessary to render a death penalty statute constitutional).
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domness [of state death penalty systems]."62 Avoiding rarity and ran-
domness remains a mandate of Furman and the constitutional framework
governing capital punishment in this country. Brauchler and Orman's
repeated suggestion that Furman, much less the requirement of narrow-
ing, are not constitutional mandates i  indefensible; indeed, the Justices
have individually and as a Court repeatedly and without hesitation rec-
ognized Furman as creating this binding law on more than a dozen occa-
sions at this point.63
Furman and its progeny make clear that a capital statute must nar-
row the pool of all murderers to a small group eligible for death and that
this narrowing must occur through legislative definition rather than the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Explaining the holding of Furman,
in Zant v. Stephens, a case inexplicably missing from Brauchler and
Orman's analysis, the Court stated that the process of narrowing is a
"constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative defini-
tion."65 In other words, narrowing is a legislative function, not a matter
of moral judgment or prosecutorial discretion. The Court has recognized
that the Eighth Amendment requires that narrowing occur through jury
findings of a statutorily enacted "aggravating circumstance (or its
equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase."66
This straightforward rule has huge implications that vindicate our
research methods and are devastating to Brauchler and Orman's critique.
Brauchler and Orman live in a world where the requirement of legisla-
tively enacted narrowing is not constitutionally mandated. Indeed, they
blithely claim that "[o]f course, more than just the death penalty statute
needs to be considered,"67 rejecting the holding of Furman, Zant, and
their progeny that narrowing is a legislative act. They even go so far as to
claim that the most serious defect of our research is our failure to "in-
clude any analysis whatsoever concerning the jury's consideration of
mitigation and weighing mitigation against aggravation."68 We have re-
sponded at length to this misplaced attack elsewhere,69 so a short rebuttal
of this point will suffice.
Colorado's capital sentencing framework is comprised of four stag-
es (called "phases" or "steps"): (1) a jury finding of one or more aggra-
vating factors; (2) the assessing of mitigating factors; (3) weighing ag-
gravating factors against mitigating factors to determine whether the case
62. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657-58 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), overruled on
other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
63. See cases cited supra note 62.
64. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
65. Id. at 878 (emphasis added).
66. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 644.
68. Id at 663-64.
69. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 47, at 1038.
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in mitigation is sufficient to justify mercy; and (4) even if the weighing
does not favor life over death, a determination whether death is the ap-
propriate penalty.70 It is true that we included in our narrowing study
only the first stage-the finding of aggravating factors.7' But we did so
deliberately and with good reason. The assessing of mitigating factors
and the purely "moral assessment"72 of whether mitigating factors out-
weigh aggravating factors are not objective and determinate questions of
fact of the sort the Supreme Court has described when it speaks of nar-
rowing. While they are very relevant to who lives and who dies under
Colorado law, they cannot do the work of constitutional narrowing.
That is because the Supreme Court has made clear that the eligibil-
ity factors-those factors that make one eligible for the ultimate penal-
ty-must be sufficiently objective that they "require an answer to afac-
tual question."73 This is why our research question was whether the eli-
gibility factors in Colorado-those determinate, factual questions that
create the preconditions for a death sentence-are serving a meaningful
narrowing function. While there may be other prerequisites to the impo-
sition of a death sentence-the decision of a prosecutor to pursue the
death penalty, a jury's conviction of a capital crime, the decision that the
case in mitigation does not outweigh the aggravating factors, the ultimate
decision to spare or condemn the defendant-those are not the kind of
objective, narrowing factors that the Supreme Court has mandated.
Confirming this point, the Supreme Court, subsequent o the publi-
cation of the Brauchler and Orman article, has further weakened the ar-
gument that Colorado's third-stage (the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating factors) is an eligibility question of the sort we were measur-
70. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1088-89 (Colo. 2007) (en bane).
71. Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1110.
72. In Colorado, the third phase weighing decision is indisputably a moral, not factual, eval-
uation. See People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 845 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) (calling Colorado's weighing
decision a "moral evaluation"), superseded by statute COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-102(1) (1993), as
recognized by People v. Vance, 933 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1997) (en banc), disapproved by Griego v.
People, 19 P.3d I (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (regarding whether an order granting a new trial is final,
which is immediately appealable); id at 844 ("[T]he weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors
differs fundamentally from the functions of a jury in finding facts and applying the law as instructed
by the court."); id. (stating that the "essence of the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating
factors" is a "moral evaluation"). Brauchler should remember this from the James Holmes trial, at
which the trial judge instructed jurors that "each of you will be called upon to deliberate to make
decisions based on your individual reasoned moral judgment." See Jury Instructions-Phase 2 of
Sentencing Hearing, at Instruction No. 1, People v. Holmes, No. 12-CR-1522 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Arap-
ahoe Cty. July 30, 2015) [hereinafter Holmes Instructions],
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/CourtProbation/18thJudicialDistrict/1 8thCourts/ 12
CR1522/011/Jury/20lnstructions(l).pdf; id. at Instruction No. 2 (mitigation may bear on "the
defendant's moral culpability"); id. at Instruction No. 5 ("Each juror must use his or her own person-
al discretion, life experiences, and reasoned moral judgment in determining for himself or herself
what mitigating factors exist."); id. ("[T]he weighing process requires a critical evaluation of the
mitigating factors and the aggravating factors so that you can make a reasoned moral judgment as to
whether you are individually convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating factors do not
outweigh the aggravating factors.").
73. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 978 (1994) (emphasis added).
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ing in our study. In Kansas v. Carr,74 the Court explained that the pro-
cess of assessing mitigating evidence is not subject to clear standards of
proof because it is not truly a factual or evidentiary matter:
[W]e doubt whether it is even possible to apply a standard of proof
to the mitigating-factor determination (the so-called "selection phase" of
a capital-sentencing proceeding). It is possible to do so for the aggravat-
ing-factor determination (the so-called "eligibility phase"), because that
is a purely factual determination. The facts justifying death set forth in
the Kansas statute either did or did not exist-and one can require the
finding that they did exist to be made beyond a reasonable doubt.
Whether mitigation exists, however, is largely a judgment call (or per-
haps a value call); what one juror might consider mitigating another
might not. And of course the ultimate question whether mitigating cir-
cumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances is mostly a question of
mercy-the quality of which, as we know, is not strained.75
Carr's reasoning reiterates the Court's view that death eligibility
turns on "purely factual" matters while issues of penalty selection turn on
moral "judgment call[s]."76 In Brauchler and Orman's view, determining
the ability of the Colorado death penalty system to meaningfully narrow
requires an examination of the weighing of aggravators and mitigators
(stage three of the Colorado system). But the Colorado Supreme Court
unequivocally disagrees with this reading of the capital statute-
"whether mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances
is mostly a question of mercy."7 7 The existence of an aggravating factor
alone does not guarantee a death sentence, to be sure, but proof of an
aggravating factor serves as the definitive, objective, factual limit on the
imposition of the death penalty, and it was there that our focus was right-
ly placed.78 Despite sweeping ad hominem suggesting that we should be
74. 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016).
75. Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
76. Id
77. Id.; see People v. Rodriguez, 794 P.2d 965, 973, 987 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (stating that
mercy and sympathy for the defendant can be considered at steps two (mitigation) and three (weigh-
ing)); see also Holmes Instructions, supra note 73, at Instruction No. 2 ("[A] mitigating factor is a
fact or circumstance which, in fairness or mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the
degree of the defendant's moral culpability or as diminishing the appropriateness of a death sen-
tence."); id at Instruction No. 8 ("You may consider mercy for the defendant during Phase 2 of the
sentencing hearing.").
78. The statutory aggravating factor is the starting point for research in the field. See Kathe-
rine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Decision-Making in
Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIz. L. REV. 305, 321 (2009) ("The purpose of statutory aggravators is to
significantly narrow the immense discretion that prosecutors wield in making decisions to seek the
death penalty and juries wield in making decisions to impose the death penalty."); see also, e.g.,
JOHN J. DONOHUE III, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONNECTICUT, 1973-2007: A COMPREHENSIVE
EVALUATION FROM 4686 MURDERS TO ONE EXECUTION 175 (2011); David C. Baldus et al., Racial
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Experience of the United States
Armed Forces (1984-2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1229 (2011); Raymond Pater-
noster et al., Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland,
1978-1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 1, 20 (2004); Glenn L. Pierce & Mi-
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ashamed of our methodology, we proudly stand by our conclusion that
statutory narrowing occurs in Colorado only through the application of
aggravating factors.7 9
B. Prosecutorial Discretion Is Not Constitutional Narrowing
Brauchler and Orman also take great umbrage with our discussion
of one particular aggravating factor-that the defendant lay in wait for
his victim. In the background section of our study we commented that
"[fjor any murderer who kills 'after deliberation,' it will be the rare case
in which the perpetrator did not also surprise the victim, or at least wait
for an opportune moment to kill. Thus, the lying in wait aggravator has
application in an extremely large number of murder cases in Colorado."8 0
Brauchler and Orman respond to this sentence in the following manner:
Failing to cite to any source for their conclusion, the Authors claim
that this applies to almost any first degree murder after delibera-
tion ... . Here, the Study seems to suffer from what one can under-
statedly call a dearth of practical experience. By contending that the
absence of "lying in wait or ambush" aggravator is rare in a first de-
gree murder prosecution, the Study demonstrates a misunderstanding
of the nature of first degree murder prosecutions in Colorado and,
likely, any other state. Indeed, our practical experience, and that of
chael L. Radelet, Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 1988-1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39,
55-56 (2002); Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 24, at 1313, 1318-19.
79. Closely related, Brauchler and Orman repeatedly make the self-serving claim that our
study is "replete with oversimplifications." Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 662. The alleged
"over-simplification" that they press most fervently is our conclusion-borrowed from the Supreme
Court-that low death sentencing rates naturally flow from unreasonably high death eligibility rates.
Id. at 662-63. As Justice White explained in Gregg, when a death penalty system is sufficiently
narrowed through aggravating factors, as in Georgia, "it becomes reasonable to expect that ju-
ries ... will impose the death penalty in a substantial portion of the cases so defined." Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring). The counterintuitive nature of the Eighth
Amendment claim we articulate is exactly consistent with the Supreme Court's discussion of nar-
rowing: Since 1972 a showing that too few people being sentenced to death (out of the too many
eligible for death) will state an Eighth Amendment claim. Brauchler and Orman mock this claim, but
there is nothing comical or simplistic about a straightforward application of constitutional law. As
we acknowledge repeatedly in our own study, though it seems paradoxical to argue that a death
sentencing rate that is too low evinces a constitutional problem, this is what the Eighth Amendment
dictates. See Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1078 n.37; id at 1082 ("[I]t is this require-
ment of legislative narrowing that renders sensible the otherwise counterintuitive claim that a capital
sentencing scheme that produces too low of a death sentence rate is unconstitutional."). When death
eligibility is too high-that is, when the legislatively enacted narrowing devices do not sufficiently
limit the class of persons eligible for the death penalty-leading researchers and the Supreme Court
have predicted exactly what our study shows-unconstitutionally low death sentencing rates. Id. at
1078, 1092-93. Thus, Brauchler and Orman claim that we "want it both ways" because we claim
that too many defendants are death eligible while also citing the low death sentencing rate. Brauchler
& Orman, supra note 3, at 644. This criticism betrays a lack of understanding of the Eighth Amend-
ment doctrine at issue. High rates of death eligibility give rise to low death sentencing rates-
because so many are eligible for death, a small percentage of those elgible will be sentenced to
death. This point seems to be entirely lost on Brauchler and Orman.
80. Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1089.
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other prosecutors with whom we have discussed this issue, shows
killing from ambush, or lying in wait, are the rare case. Very rare.si
While it is true that we did not cite a source for our assertion, one is
ready at hand. Over a strenuous defense objection, lawyers in Brauchler
and Orman's office argued that the lying in wait aggravator was support-
ed by the evidence in the case of Edward Montour.82 Montour was
charged, convicted, and subsequently sentenced to death for killing a
prison guard with an industrial-size soup ladle while working in the
kitchen. The prosecution argued that because the defendant surprised the
victim or waited for an opportune moment to kill, the lying in wait ag-
gravator applied to his case, and the trial court agreed:
The People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defend-
ant concealed his purpose and his intention to kill Sergeant Autobee.
Clearly the concealment of physical presence is sufficient to establish
a claim of lying in wait. The issue is whether concealment of purpose
or intent is also sufficient to establish a claim of lying in wait. There
is no specific Colorado case law on this issue. Other jurisdictions
have indicated that lying in wait covers, in addition to physical con-
cealment, concealment of purpose or intention. See People v. Mo-
rales, 770 P.2d 244 (Calif. 1989), and People v. Carpenter. 935 P.2d
708 (Calif. 1997). Given the facts outlined above in People's Exhibit
50 concerning the Defendant's waiting for the opportunity to strike
the victim and the concealment of the purpose of his actions from the
victim, this Court finds that this aggravator has been established be-
yond a reasonable doubt.83
In other words, at the urging of Brauchler and Orman's own col-
leagues, a Colorado court has concluded that the lying in wait aggravator
applies any time a defendant seeks to surprise the victim or any time the
defendant seeks an advantageous opportunity to kill and conceals his or
her purpose. This is the definition of lying in wait urged (successfully)
by Brauchler's own office-we simply applied it. 4
We mention this critique of our use of the lying in wait aggravator
because it is but one of many places in their article that Brauchler and
Orman appeal for deference to their years of trial court experience. Per-
haps what Brauchler and Orman mean to say is that they would not
charge "lying in wait" in the vast majority of deliberate killings. This
81. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 661-62.
82. Sentencing Order at 10-11, People v. Montour, No. 02-CR-782 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Douglas
Cty. Feb. 27, 2003).
83. Id at 11.
84. There were twenty-two formal death prosecutions during the study period. See Marceau,
Kamin & Foglia, supra note 9, at 1111. Of the twenty-one such prosecutions in which a notice of
aggravating factors was filed, the lying in wait aggravating factor was alleged in nine cases, which
belies the claim that Brauchler and Orman make about this factor being regarded as "very rare."
Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 662.
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might be true, but it has no bearing whatsoever on our conclusions or on
the constitutionality of the Colorado statute. Whether Brauchler and Or-
man may personally choose to apply a narrowing construction to this
aggravating factor has no relevance to the question of whether, at the
stage of legislative definition, the aggravating factors in the Colorado
capital statute narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. Just as pros-
ecutors cannot save Colorado's statute by promising, for example, that
they would never seek death unless two or more aggravators are clearly
present, they cannot by fiat redefine an aggravating factor so as to render
its application less capacious. Constitutional narrowing must occur
through legislative enactment of objective criteria, not through prosecu-
torial grace.
C. Colorado's First-Degree Murder Is Not Narrowly Circumscribed
Among Brauchler and Orman's many misstatements, one of the
most blatant is their assertion that Colorado's "definition of 'first-degree
murder"' is narrower than most all other states . They make this claim to
counter our findings (which their own office confirmed) that the aggra-
vating factors do not do any meaningful narrowing work under the cur-
rent statutory framework. And it is at least theoretically possible that for
a state's narrowing to be done not just by the aggravating factors, but by
a very specific first-degree murder statute. The problem, however, is that
their characterization of Colorado's first-degree murder provision is en-
tirely divorced from the textual reality and from the operation of the stat-
ute in practice.
Colorado law permits one to be convicted of first-degree murder
based on an unintentional killing-killing with extreme indifference is a
category of first-degree murder in our state.86 Very few, if any, other
states allow one to be guilty of the highest grade of murder for a single
unintentional, non-felony murder. Furthermore, all felony murder in
Colorado is first-degree murder; unlike most other states, Colorado's
murder statute lacks a second-degree felony murder provision. Brauchler
and Orman attempt to elide these damaging facts by arguing that the
"most utilized theory of first-degree murder" is a killing that occurs "af-
ter deliberation," which they explain is narrower than first-degree murder
in some other jurisdictions.87 This is yet another example of the prosecu-
tors attempting to use their own discretion to fix flaws in the capital stat-
ute. They argue that the relevant definition of first-degree murder is what
their office is likely to prosecute as first-degree murder, rather than what
the statute actually says. Of course, this is not how a legal system
works-a statute is judged on its words, not simply on the way a pair of
prosecutors choose to understand and apply those words. There is noth-
85. Id. at 644.
86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(d) (2016).
87. Brauchler & Orman, supra note 3, at 644-45.
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ing Brauchler and Orman can say that would change the plain reality of
the Colorado statute, which is that it allows nearly 90% of murders to be
prosecuted as first-degree murders. So instead, they ignore the actual
Colorado statute and analyze only the "after deliberation" form of first-
degree murder.
III. CONCLUSION: COLORADO'S DEATH PENALTY IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Brauchler and Orman article strains mightily to convince read-
ers that the death penalty in Colorado is simply a matter to be determined
by public opinion. Their article is replete with data about the popularity
of capital punishment in this state. From this data they conclude that
Colorado's death penalty is constitutional and that our research is irrele-
vant. Trust us, they seem to say, the death penalty is working fine.
This is one of the themes in their article; after the inflammatory lan-
guage is stripped away, one is left with little more than a demand by two
powerful prosecutors to be left alone. Pay no attention to those academ-
ics, they argue, the death penalty is working just fine, and the people of
the state are happy with how we and other prosecutors are using it. It is a
chilling and dark commentary on how these career prosecutors and poli-
ticians view academic scholarship. They attack the credibility and the
methods of the messengers, rather than taking accountability for what we
have shown are profound shortcomings in the current system.
What all of their invective cannot do, however, is change the facts
or law regarding the death penalty in Colorado; as our study shows, Col-
orado's death penalty statute fails to pass constitutional muster. We show
that nearly every murder in Colorado could be charged as first-degree
murder, and nearly every one of those is statutorily eligible for the death
penalty. Our numbers could not be more clear, and the conclusion from
them could not be more straightforward: Colorado's death penalty is
fatally, unconstitutionally defective. We would hope that Brauchler and
Orman would spend their time constructively trying to fix a broken sys-
tem rather than assailing our motives and attacking our concrete mpiri-
cal evidence.
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